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Most left behind parents are fathers, not mothers. In 2008, the latest year for
which statistics of international parental abductions are available, fifty-nine percent
of parents taking children to the United States were mothers, and mothers
constituted sixty-nine percent of taking parents worldwide. Hague Conference on
Private International Law, A Statistical Analysis of Applications Made in 2008
Under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, Part III—National Reports, 6, (May 2011) available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abduct2011pd08c.pdf. These percentages were
1
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A man and a woman from the United States met, got
married, and started a family in England. They lived happily for
some time, but later decided to separate. After a contentious
divorce and a hard-fought custody battle, the mother received
primary custody of their two young children, and the father
received visitation every other weekend. He loved his children
and lived for their weekends together. But one weekend, several
years after the divorce, he was unable to get in contact with his
wife. He called and sent messages to no avail; he went to her
house only to find that she had moved out a week and a half
before. Finally, after two weeks had passed, he received the call:
She had taken the children to the United States, she wanted to
move back home, and she did not want to see him—or to let the
children see him—ever again.
The father was devastated and turned to the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction (“Hague
Convention”), which operates through the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”) in the United States, for help
in restoring his visits with his children. Unfortunately, his
efforts proved unsuccessful. This Note explores why.1
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The Hague Convention “protect[s] children internationally
from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention
and . . . establish[es] procedures to ensure their prompt return to
the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure
protection for rights of access.”2 It was ratified in the United
States on April 29, 1988, and on that day, President Reagan also
signed ICARA into law.3
Both the Hague Convention and ICARA are meant to
provide a method for seeking the return of a child or enforcing
visitation rights for a child who has been abducted
internationally by a parent or guardian. However, both have
been widely criticized as falling short when it comes to visitation
rights.4 Unlike petitions under the more well-known aspects of
the Hague Convention and ICARA, which provide for a child’s
repatriation to the country of last habitual residence, visitation
petitions do not fare well in the United States. Federal district
courts regularly deny visitation enforcement requests for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, essentially leaving no recourse in the
federal court system for noncustodial parents whose children are
abducted by custodial parents and taken to the United States.5
Further, prior to 2013, the only federal circuit court that had
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consistent with the two previous surveys conducted in 1999 and 2003. Id.
Additionally, approximately seventy-two percent of taking parents were the child’s
primary caretaker. Hague Conference on Private International Law, A Statistical
Analysis of Applications Made in 2008 Under the Hague Convention of 25 October
1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Part I—Global Report, 6,
(May 2011), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abduct2011pd08ae.pdf.
2
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, opened for
signature Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague
Convention].
3
Id. The Hague Convention entered into force on December 1, 1983 was ratified
by the United States on April 29, 1988 and was proclaimed by President Reagan on
November
7,
1988.
International
Child
Abduction
Remedies
Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 11601–11611 (2012) (current version at 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011 (2012)).
4
See Bromley v. Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d 857, 860–61 & n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(compiling journal articles that have criticized the failure to provide a remedy
concerning visitation rights for parents); Priscilla Steward, Access Rights: A
Necessary Corollary to Custody Rights Under the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 308, 331 (1997)
(“Although Article 21 [of The Hague Convention] recognizes rights of [visitation], the
Convention has no provisions that enforces [sic] such rights. Experts say that one of
the Convention’s biggest failures is its ineffectiveness at securing rights of
[visitation].” (footnote omitted)).
5
See, e.g., Wiezel v. Wiezel-Tyrnauer, 388 F. Supp. 2d 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Wiggill v. Janicki, 262 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (S.D. W. Va. 2003); Bromley, 30 F. Supp.
2d at 862.
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442 F.3d 196 (4th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 197.
708 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 371.
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considered a claim for enforcement of visitation rights was the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Cantor
v. Cohen.6 The Fourth Circuit held, just as several district courts
had, that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a claim for the
enforcement of visitation rights under ICARA.7 However, in
February 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit also had the opportunity to hear this issue in
Ozaltin v. Ozaltin,8 and it came to the opposite conclusion. In
Ozaltin, the Second Circuit held that ICARA does create a
federal right of action for the enforcement of visitation rights,
thereby declaring that federal courts do have subject-matter
jurisdiction over such claims.9
This Note argues that the Second Circuit’s approach is more
consistent with the aims of the Hague Convention and the needs
of children than the Fourth Circuit’s approach and that ICARA
does confer jurisdiction upon federal courts to adjudicate claims
for the enforcement of visitation rights under the Hague
Convention. Part I discusses the background of the Hague
Convention and ICARA and how visitation rights fit into each.
Part II discusses the split between the Fourth Circuit and the
Second Circuit regarding whether ICARA confers jurisdiction
upon federal courts over claims for the enforcement of visitation
rights. It further examines the issue by analyzing the holdings of
a number of district courts that have held that they lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction to consider claims for enforcement of
visitation rights under ICARA. Part III argues that the Second
Circuit was correct in holding that ICARA creates a federal right
of action for the enforcement of visitation rights and that federal
courts do in fact have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear such
claims.
Part IV suggests an amendment to the Hague
Convention that would prevent future decisions in which federal
courts dismiss visitation claims under ICARA for lack of
jurisdiction.
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BACKGROUND OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND ICARA

The Hague Convention

The Hague Conference on Private International Law
(“Conference”) is an intergovernmental organization comprised of
seventy-seven members—seventy-six nations and the European
Union.10 The Conference was created in 1893 and earned
permanency as an intergovernmental organization in 1955
through the enactment of its statute, which declared it a
permanent character in the international community.11 Since its
inception, the Conference has met every four years to negotiate
and adopt conventions and to discuss future work.12 One such
convention, concluded on October 25, 1980, was the Hague
Convention.13
The Hague Convention addressed concerns with the growing
incidence of international parental child abduction fueled by the
ease of international travel, the increasing number of bicultural
marriages, and the rising divorce rate.14 This concern was due to
the potentially serious consequences for children as well as the
parents who have been left behind when an international child
abduction occurs.15 Not only is the child removed from contact
with the parent who has been left behind, but the child is also

04/08/2016 13:04:55

C M
Y K

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 306 Side B

10
Overview, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, http://www.hcch.net/
index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=26 (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
11
Id.
12
Id. Along with the seventy-seven members, nonmember States have
increasingly become parties to Hague Conventions, resulting in more than 140
countries around the world being involved with the Hague Conference. Id.
13
Hague Convention, supra note 2. The Hague Convention presently has ninety
“Contracting States,” sixty-four of which are members of the Conference and twentysix of which are not members of the Conference. Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Status Table, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=con
ventions.status&cid=24 (last visited Mar. 28, 2015) [hereinafter Status Table].
Contracting States are signatory states that have ratified the Hague Convention.
See Scott M. Smith, Annotation, Construction and Application of International Child
Abduction Remedies Act (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11601 et seq.), 125 A.L.R. FED. 217 § 2
(1995).
14
Outline: Hague Child Abduction Convention, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON
PRIVATE INT’L LAW 1 (May 2014), http://www.hcch.net/upload/outline28e.pdf. Many
such abductors are custodial mothers who wish to return to their home country after
their marriage to a foreign citizen caused them to live abroad. See Linda Silberman,
Patching up the Abduction Convention: A Call for a New International Protocol and
a Suggestion for Amendments to ICARA, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 41, 45 (2003).
15
Outline: Hague Child Abduction Convention, supra note 14.
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Id.
Hague Convention, supra note 2.
18
Id. art. 1, 3 (“The removal or the retention of a child is considered wrongful
where—it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or
any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child
was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and . . . at the
time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or
alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.”).
19
Id. art. 5.
20
Id.
21
See id; see also 42 U.S.C. § 11602 (2012) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 9002
(2012)) (“[T]he term ‘rights of access’ means visitation rights.”). While the Hague
Convention uses the term “access rights,” this Note uses the term “visitation rights,”
as the two terms are synonymous and “visitation rights” is the more commonly used
term.
22
Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 8.
17
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removed from a familiar environment and relocated to an
environment in which the social structure, culture, and even
language may be completely different.16 These concerns are
enunciated clearly in the enacting provision of the Hague
Convention, which describes its purpose as “protect[ing] children
internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful
removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure their
prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as
to secure protection for rights of access.”17
The Hague Convention consists of forty-five articles, the
objectives of which are “to secure the prompt return of children
wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State;
and . . . to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the
law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other
Contracting States.”18 Article 5 explains that “ ‘rights of custody’
shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child
and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of
residence,”19 while “ ‘rights of access’ shall include the right to
take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the
child’s habitual residence.”20 Therefore, “rights of access” are
essentially visitation rights for the noncustodial parent.21 The
Hague Convention also sets forth the remedies available for
breaches of custody rights and for breaches of visitation rights.22
In order to address such breaches, the Hague Convention
requires that each “Contracting State” establish a “Central
Authority,” which has “the broad mandate of assisting applicants
to secure the return of their children or the effective excercise
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[sic] of their visitation rights.”23
According to the Hague
Convention, the breach of custody rights requires the Central
Authority to issue an order for the return of the child to the
child’s home country.24
The Hague Convention was signed by the United States on
December 23, 1981, ratified by the President on April 29, 1988,
and entered into force on July 1, 1988.25 On the same day that he
ratified the Hague Convention, President Reagan signed
ICARA.26
B.

The International Child Abduction Remedies Act

The Hague Convention is, in form, a self-executing treaty,
and therefore no implementing legislation was necessary to bring
it into force.27 The United States nonetheless implemented it
through ICARA in order to “fit this unique treaty smoothly into
our legal system with its federal and state court systems,
potential venue questions, privacy legislation, and other features
that distinguish the United States from many other countries.”28
In its findings section, Congress emphasized its belief that
international child abduction and retention is harmful to
children, that the incidence of international child abduction is on
the rise, and that custody should not be obtained by the wrongful
removal or retention of the child.29 Pursuant to these findings,
ICARA provides a procedural mechanism that protects the rights

04/08/2016 13:04:55

C M
Y K

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 307 Side B

23
Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis,
51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,511 (Mar. 26, 1986). A “Central Authority” is the local
agency in the receiving state which is responsible for coordinating repatriation and
visitation requests under the Hague Convention. The Central Authority for the
United States is the Department of State, Office of Children’s Issues. See Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Statistical Analysis Part II: National
Reports United States, at 1, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=publications.det
ails&pid=2857&dtid=32 (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
24
Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 12.
25
See Status Table, supra note 13.
26
See Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 378 n.4 (2d Cir. 2013).
27
Id. at 359 n.5. While the Hague Convention has also been characterized as a
non-self-executing treaty, further inquiry into this is unnecessary because ICARA,
an implementing legislation, was enacted in the United States. See, e.g., Cantor v.
Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 210 (4th Cir. 2006) (Traxler, J., dissenting); Brooke L. Myers,
Note, Treaties and Federal Question Jurisdiction: Enforcing Treaty-Based Rights in
Federal Court, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1449, 1487 (2007).
28
Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 359 n.5.
29
42 U.S.C. § 11601 (2012) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 9001 (2012)).
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provided in the Hague Convention.30 Through ICARA, Congress
vested original jurisdiction over actions arising under the Hague
Convention and ICARA concurrently in state courts and federal
district courts.31 ICARA provides:
Any person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings under the
Convention for the return of a child or for arrangements for
organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of
[visitation] to a child may do so by commencing a civil
action . . . in any court which has jurisdiction of such
action . . . .32

However, because ICARA itself does not provide any substantive
rights,33 federal courts must refer to the Hague Convention in
order to determine what rights are protected.
While the
mechanisms for seeking the return of a child are clearly laid out
in article 12 of the Hague Convention, the mechanisms for
organizing exercise of visitation rights are not as clear.34
C.

Visitation Rights

1.

Under the Hague Convention

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

30
See Smith, supra note 13 (“ICARA . . . is merely a procedural mechanism
allowing access to the remedies provided in the Convention.”).
31
Id.
32
42 U.S.C § 11603.
33
See Smith, supra note 13.
34
Compare Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 12 (“Where a child has been
wrongfully removed or retained . . . the authority concerned shall order the return of
the child forthwith.”), with Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 21 (“The Central
Authorities shall take steps to remove, as far as possible, all obstacles to the exercise
of [visitation] rights.”).
35
Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis,
51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,513 (Mar. 26, 1986).
36
Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 21.
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Admittedly, the Hague Convention protects visitation rights
to a lesser extent than it does custody rights, and the remedies
available for a breach of visitation rights do not include the
return remedy that is provided for wrongful removals and
retentions.35 However, visitation rights are protected primarily
in article 21, which provides that “[a]n application to make
arrangements for organising [sic] or securing the effective
exercise of rights of [visitation] may be presented to the Central
Authorities of the Contracting States in the same way as an
application for the return of a child.”36 Once the Central
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Authority receives a visitation enforcement application, it “shall
take steps to remove, as far as possible, all obstacles to the
exercise of such rights.”37 Further, the Central Authority is to
take all appropriate measures pursuant to article 7 to “promote
the peaceful enjoyment of [visitation] rights and the fulfillment of
any conditions to which the exercise of those rights is subject.”38
An aggrieved parent may also apply directly to the judicial
authorities of the Contracting State for relief under other
applicable laws, pursuant to article 29, which provides:
This Convention shall not preclude any person, institution or
body who claims that there has been a breach of custody or
[visitation] rights within the meaning of Article 3 or 21 from
applying directly to the judicial or administrative authorities of
a Contracting State, whether or not under the provisions of this
Convention.39

2.

Under ICARA

ICARA, too, addresses visitation rights. In § 11603, ICARA
provides that “[a]ny person seeking to initiate judicial
proceedings under the Convention for . . . arrangements for
organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of
[visitation] to a child may do so by commencing a civil action by

37

Id.
Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal Analysis,
51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,513 (Mar. 26, 1986). Article 7 of the Hague Convention lists
the following responsibilities of the Central Authorities:
(a) [T]o discover the whereabouts of a child who has been wrongfully
removed or retained; (b) to prevent further harm to the child or prejudice to
interested parties by taking or causing to be taken provisional measures;
(c) to secure the voluntary return of the child or to bring about an amicable
resolution of the issues; (d) to exchange, where desirable, information
relating to the social background of the child; (e) to provide information of a
general character as to the law of their State in connection with the
application of the Convention; (f) to initiate or facilitate the institution of
judicial or administrative proceedings with a view to obtaining the return
of the child and, in a proper case, to make arrangements for organising [sic]
or securing the effective exercise of rights of [visitation]; (g) where the
circumstances so require, to provide or facilitate the provision of legal aid
and advice, including the participation of legal counsel and advisers; (h) to
provide such administrative arrangements as may be necessary and
appropriate to secure the safe return of the child; (i) to keep each other
informed with respect to the operation of this Convention and, as far as
possible, to eliminate any obstacles to its application.
Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 7.
39
Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 29.
38
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filing a petition . . . in any court which has jurisdiction of such
action.”40 The same section goes on to provide the relevant
burden of proof in cases pertaining to visitation
rights—petitioners must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that they have such rights.41 ICARA does not create
new substantive rights and the federal courts do not have the
power to grant visitation rights to noncustodial parents where
none previously existed.
However, ICARA undoubtedly
empowers federal courts to enforce visitation rights that
noncustodial parents have already established in their country of
residence. For this reason, as discussed more fully below, this
Note asserts that ICARA provides federal courts with a
mechanism for remedying breaches of visitation rights by
conferring upon these courts the jurisdiction to do so.
II. FEDERAL COURT SPLIT
This Part discusses the split of authority between the Fourth
Circuit, which held that ICARA does not confer jurisdiction upon
federal courts to adjudicate claims for enforcement of visitation,42
and the Second Circuit, which held that ICARA does create a
federal right of action to secure the effective exercise of visitation
rights protected under the Hague Convention.43 Beyond the
Fourth Circuit holding alone, a number of district courts and
commentators have also found that ICARA does not bestow upon
federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction to consider claims
regarding visitation rights.

C M
Y K
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42 U.S.C. § 11603 (2012) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (2012)).
Id.
42
Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 197 (4th Cir. 2006).
43
Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 371 (2d Cir. 2013). The Second Circuit stated
that, “[p]roperly framed, the Mother’s argument is not jurisdictional in nature but
instead goes to whether § 11603(b) creates a federal right of action.” Id. at 371.
Although it stated that the issue of whether a federal statute creates a claim for
relief is not jurisdictional in nature, it went on to assert that “subject-matter
jurisdiction is also supplied by 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a).” Id. at 371 n.23. Consistent
with this assertion, the remainder of this Note refers to the claim for enforcement of
visitation rights as a jurisdictional issue. Additionally, every other federal court that
has adjudicated a case involving this specific issue has treated this as a
jurisdictional issue. See cases cited supra notes 5–6 (providing additional support for
discussing the issue in this manner).
41
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44
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Cantor, 442 F.3d at 197.
Id.
46
Id. at 197–98. The court had issued two prior divorce decrees, both of which
also dealt with the custody and visitation of the four children. Id. at 197.
47
Id. at 198.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 200.
45
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In Cantor v. Cohen, decided in 2006, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that ICARA does not
confer jurisdiction upon a federal court to hear claims for the
enforcement of visitation rights.44 Ms. Cantor and Mr. Cohen,
who both lived in Israel, married and had four children.45 The
couple later divorced, and an Israeli Rabbinical Court issued a
divorce decree providing Mr. Cohen, now living in Germany, with
custody of two of the children and Ms. Cantor with custody of the
other two.46
The divorce decree also granted Ms. Cantor
visitation with the children who were in her husband’s care in
Germany every two months and in Israel at least twice per
year.47 After this arrangement was ordered, the parents jointly
decided that all of the children should live with Mr. Cohen in
Germany.48 Thereafter, Mr. Cohen moved to the United States,
eventually residing in Silver Spring, Maryland, with all four
children.49 During this time, Ms. Cantor continued to live in
Israel.50
Ms. Cantor filed a petition in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland on October 22, 2004, seeking
the return of the children for whom she had custody orders and
also seeking enforcement of her right of visitation with the other
two children.51 The district court denied the repatriation petition
and found that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Ms.
Cantor’s visitation claims under ICARA, therefore dismissing the
claim.52 The court based its ruling on the lack of an affirmative
right to initiate judicial proceedings for visitation claims under
the Hague Convention.53 Ms. Cantor appealed to the Fourth
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Id. at 199.
Id.
56
Id. The section referred to, § 11601(a)(4) of ICARA, explains that “[t]he
Convention . . . establishes legal rights and procedures for the prompt return of the
children who have been wrongfully removed or retained, as well as for securing the
exercise of visitation rights.” Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted).
57
Id. (alteration in original).
58
Id. at 199–200.
59
Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 21.
60
Cantor, 442 F.3d at 200.
61
Id.
55
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Circuit, arguing that the plain language of § 11603(b) of ICARA
confers jurisdiction upon federal courts to hear claims seeking to
enforce visitation rights.54
In refuting Ms. Cantor’s argument that ICARA confers
federal courts with jurisdiction over such claims, the Fourth
Circuit looked first to the implementing language in § 11601 of
ICARA, finding that “particular emphasis is drawn to
Congressional concern regarding international abduction or
wrongful retention of children.”55 The court found it instructive
that the section does not mention visitation rights until the last
subsection, “and then only mentions these rights in the context of
Further, it emphasized Congress’s
the Convention.”56
declarations, which state that “[t]he Convention and this chapter
empower courts in the United States to determine only rights
under the Convention and not the merits of any underlying child
custody claims.”57
Based upon this finding, the Fourth Circuit turned to the
Hague Convention itself and considered the language of article
21, which discusses visitation.58 Article 21 states that “[a]n
application to make arrangements for organising [sic] or securing
the effective exercise of rights of [visitation] may be presented to
the Central Authorities of the Contracting States in the same
way as an application for the return of a child.”59 The Fourth
Circuit emphasized that article 21 of the Hague Convention does
not provide for the presentation of a visitation claim to a judicial
authority, in “sharp contrast” to article 12, which addresses
wrongful removal or return claims and specifically refers to the
initiation of judicial proceedings.60
The Fourth Circuit therefore found that § 11603 of ICARA
must be read in conjunction with the Hague Convention.61 In
doing so, it declared that “under the Convention” there is “no
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Id.
Id. at 202.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. (quoting 134 CONG. REC. 6484 (1988) (statement of Sen. Alan J. Dixon))
(emphasis omitted).
67
Id. at 204.
68
Id.
63
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right to initiate judicial proceedings for [visitation] claims,” and
that “federal courts are not authorized to exercise jurisdiction
over . . . claims” seeking to enforce those visitation claims.62 It
found further support for its conclusion in the “long established
precedent that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction
and generally abstain from hearing child custody matters.”63
With the exception of international child abduction and wrongful
removal claims, the court held that other child custody matters
are better handled by the state courts.64
The Fourth Circuit also examined the legislative history of
ICARA, specifically looking to procedures to implement the
Hague Convention.65 The court emphasized the discussion
surrounding concurrent original jurisdiction and highlighted a
comment made by Senator Alan J. Dixon of Illinois, in which he
stated that “none of the proponents of this bill, or my
amendment, want to see the Federal courts to be involved in
deciding the underlying custody disputes.”66
Finally, the Fourth Circuit offered one other common sense
reason for its holding: While § 11603(e)(2) of ICARA and articles
12, 13, and 20 of the Hague Convention set forth several
affirmative defenses that may be considered for a wrongful
removal claim, there are no such provisions in either ICARA or
the Hague Convention for visitation enforcement claims.67 The
court thus found it “difficult to believe that federal courts could
entertain [visitation] claims, yet would be left powerless to
consider any defenses which concern the safety or the best
interests of a child.”68
Therefore, after taking all of these factors into account, the
Fourth Circuit held that ICARA does not confer jurisdiction upon
federal courts to hear claims for enforcement of visitation
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rights.69 Based upon this holding, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s opinion and dismissed Ms. Cantor’s claim
seeking enforcement of her visitation rights.70
2.

The District Courts and Commentators

69
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See supra pp. 1007–08.
Cantor, 442 F.3d at 206. The Fourth Circuit was not unanimous in its
decision however, as Judge Traxler wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 206–13
(Traxler, J., dissenting). Judge Traxler would have held that the district court did in
fact have jurisdiction to consider the visitation claim, arguing that a straightforward
reading of ICARA suggests that it “affords aggrieved parents a judicial forum for
resolving claims that involve either custody rights or [visitation] rights.” Id. at 208.
Judge Traxler’s dissent went on to articulate essentially the same arguments as the
Second Circuit later set forth in Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355 (2d Cir. 2013). See
discussion infra Part II.B.
71
See cases cited supra note 5.
72
See, e.g., Bromley v. Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d 857, 860 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
73
See infra pp. 1010–11.
74
Id.
75
30 F. Supp. 2d 857.
76
Id. at 858–59.
70
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Numerous district courts have also held that they lacked
jurisdiction to hear claims under ICARA for noncustodial parents
seeking to secure the enforcement of visitation rights.71 These
district court decisions invariably focused on interpreting the
Hague Convention itself, and not ICARA, in deciding whether
they had jurisdiction to hear these cases, despite the fact that in
each case the petitioner asserted his claim under both the Hague
Convention and ICARA.72 The district court decisions have been
uniform in their reasoning that article 21 of the Hague
Convention, which addresses visitation rights, does not provide a
judicial remedy for breaches of such rights, while article 12,
which addresses custody rights, does provide judicial remedies
for parents seeking the return of a child.73 This difference, the
courts hold, means that the Hague Convention was not intended
to empower judicial authorities to enforce visitation claims.74
In Bromley v. Bromley,75 a noncustodial father with a
visitation order brought an action pursuant to the Hague
Convention and ICARA seeking the enforcement of his visitation
rights after the mother allegedly denied him his court-ordered
visitation with the children.76 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed his claim,
holding that it lacked jurisdiction over a claim for the
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82
83
84
85

87
88
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86

Id. at 858.
Id. at 860.
Id.
363 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
Id. at 1026–27.
Id.
Id. at 1030.
262 F. Supp. 2d 687 (S.D. W. Va. 2003).
Id. at 688–90.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 689.
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enforcement of his visitation rights.77
The district court
compared article 12 of the Hague Convention, which “clearly
provides authority for judicial authorities to order the return of a
child ‘wrongfully’ removed,” with article 21, which is silent as to a
remedy for visitation rights.78 Based on this lack of judicial
remedy, the district court held that it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear the claim.79
Similarly, the father in In re Adams ex rel. Naik v. Naik80
sought enforcement of his visitation rights.81 Like the petitioner
in Bromley, he brought his case under the Hague Convention and
ICARA after his child’s mother brought his child to the United
States without his knowledge.82 The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the father’s
petition based upon the difference in wording between article 12
of the Hague Convention, which explicitly confers jurisdiction
upon judicial authorities to effectuate the return of a child, and
article 21 of the Hague Convention, which does not grant any
such rights.83
Wiggil v. Janicki84 was decided in the same fashion.85 In this
case, the father had custody of the child and the mother had
summertime visitation rights.86 The mother petitioned the court,
under the Hague Convention and ICARA, to order the father to
pay for the child’s passport in order to facilitate the exercise of
her visitation rights.87 In keeping with the decisions of other
district courts, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia held that federal courts lack jurisdiction
to enforce visitation rights under the Hague Convention and
dismissed the petition.88
The few commentators who have written about the lack of
remedies for breaches of visitation rights have similarly looked to
the Hague Convention, rather than to ICARA, in determining
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that federal district courts have no subject-matter jurisdiction to
hear claims regarding a breach of these rights.89
These
commentators have focused on the weakness of article 21 of the
Hague Convention, emphasizing that while it recognizes parents’
visitation rights, it provides no procedures for enforcing such
rights.90 In doing so, these commentators have stressed the need
for amendments to the Hague Convention and ICARA to provide
for visitation enforcement. However, like the courts, these
commentators
have
overlooked
ICARA’s
independent
authority—apart from the Hague Convention’s provisions—to
enforce visitation rights. It is this authority, provided solely by
ICARA, on which the Second Circuit relied in enforcing visitation
rights under the Hague Convention.
B.

Recognizing Federal Jurisdiction

89
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See infra note 87.
See Steward, supra note 4, at 330–31 (“The Hague Abduction Convention
attempts to protect and facilitate the [visitation] rights of non-custodial parents in
Articles 7 and 21. . . . Although Article 21 recognizes rights of [visitation], the
Convention has no provisions that enforces [sic] such rights.”); see also Daniel M.
Fraidstern, Croll v. Croll and the Unfortunate Irony of the Hague Convention on the
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: Parents with “Rights of Access” Get
No Rights To Access Courts, 30 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 641, 662–63 (2005)
(“Unfortunately, however, the remedies presented to a noncustodial parent [by the
Hague Convention] are insufficient; they do not adequately serve the interests of
justice, they may not be in the best interests of the child, and they do not serve the
purpose of the treaty.” (footnote omitted)); Silberman, supra note 14, at 48 (“The
Convention’s mechanisms for enforcement of [visitation] rights, which were always
less than robust, have been further limited by various court interpretations.”).
91
708 F.3d 355, 357–58 (2d Cir. 2013).
92
Id. at 360.
93
Id.
90
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On February 11, 2013, the Second Circuit became the first
U.S. circuit court to hold that federal courts do have jurisdiction
to consider a claim for visitation under ICARA with its ruling in
Ozaltin v. Ozaltin.91 Nurettin Ozaltin (“father”) and Zeynep
Ozaltin (“mother”), each of whom was a dual citizen of Turkey
and the United States, were married and had two daughters
together.92 The children resided primarily in Turkey with both
parents until the mother took the children to New York following
a fight with the father.93
Approximately two weeks later, the father filed an
application with the Turkish Ministry of Justice, in accordance
with the Hague Convention, seeking an order that the mother
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Id.
Id. at 361.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 362.
98
Id. (footnote omitted).
99
Id. at 357, 363.
100
Id. at 364.
101
Id. at 365.
102
Id. The mother also appealed the order requiring her to return the children
to Turkey, arguing, unsuccessfully, that she removed the children from Turkey with
the consent of the Turkish court. Id. The remainder of the discussion of this case
does not address the return order issue, but rather focuses on the visitation issue.
95

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 312 Side B

return the children to Turkey.94 At that time, the mother
initiated divorce proceedings in Turkey and the Turkish court
granted the father alternate weekend visits in the United
States.95 The father exercised this right several times between
May and August of 2011.96 However, eventually the mother
began attempting to limit his access by imposing conditions and
other restrictions that the Turkish court had not.97
The father filed an action in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 11603(b), seeking “(1) an order enforcing his
visitation rights, pursuant to Article 21 of the Hague Convention;
[and] (2) an order requiring the [m]other to return the children to
Turkey, pursuant to Article 12 of the Hague Convention.”98
Shortly thereafter, the district court issued an order requiring
the mother to allow the father his visitation rights granted by the
Turkish court “as long as [the children] stayed in the United
States with their mother” and ordering the mother to show cause
as to why the petition should not be granted in full.99 After a two
month trial, the district court issued an order requiring the
mother to “(1) comply with the Turkish court’s visitation order,
[and] (2) return the children to Turkey by July 15, 2012.”100
The mother did return the children to Turkey but continued
to contest the district court’s order, including the order upholding
the father’s visitation rights that had been granted in Turkey.101
She appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that federal courts
lack subject-matter jurisdiction over claims seeking to enforce
visitation rights.102 She further argued that the only method to
seek the enforcement of visitation rights is in a state court, or
through the Department of State, acting in its role as the
“Central Authority” for the United States under the Hague
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Convention.103 The Second Circuit disagreed with the mother’s
argument, holding that ICARA does in fact create a federal right
of action to enforce visitation rights and thereby asserting
jurisdiction over the father’s claim.104
The Second Circuit based its determination primarily on a
plain reading of the statute. In a sharp departure from the line
of cases discussed in Section A, the Second Circuit held that
“[t]he statutory basis for a federal right of action to enforce
[visitation] rights under the Hague Convention could hardly be
clearer.”105 The Second Circuit first looked to the enacting
legislation, which states that “[t]he courts of the States and the
United States district courts shall have concurrent original
jurisdiction of actions arising under the [Hague] Convention.”106
The enacting legislation continues:
Any person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings under the
Convention for the return of a child or for arrangements for
organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of
[visitation] to a child may do so by commencing a civil action by
filing a petition for the relief sought in any court which has
jurisdiction of such action and which is authorized to exercise
its jurisdiction in the place where the child is located at the time
the petition is filed.107

103
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Id. at 371.
Id.
105
Id. at 372.
106
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11603 (2012) (current
version at 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (2012))).
107
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11603).
108
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 11603).
109
Id.
104
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Further, the statute even provides for the burden of proof
necessary in cases regarding visitation in § 11603(e)(1)(B): “A
petitioner in an action brought under subsection (b) of this
section shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence . . . in
the case of an action for arrangements for organizing or securing
the effective exercise of rights of [visitation], that the petitioner
has such rights.”108 The Second Circuit read these sections of the
statute together and concluded that ICARA “unambiguously
creates a federal right of action to secure the effective exercise of
[visitation] rights” protected under the Hague Convention.109
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The Second Circuit found further support for its conclusion
that the courts must assume jurisdiction in the fact that the
Central Authority “apparent[ly] lack[s] . . . any administrative
The Hague
apparatus for enforcing [visitation] rights.”110
Convention provides:
[A] Central Authority . . . must offer facilitative services to the
petitioner, such as taking appropriate measures to “discover the
whereabouts of [the] child,” “bring about an amicable resolution
of the issues,” and, as particularly relevant here, “initiate or
facilitate the institution of judicial or administrative
proceedings with a view to obtaining the return of the
child . . . .”111

The Second Circuit concluded that this “facilitative” role does not
displace or inhibit the ability of a party to make a claim directly
to a federal court under ICARA.112
Therefore, considering the statutory interpretation of ICARA
along with the lack of administrative remedies available through
the Hague Convention and ICARA, the Second Circuit held that
federal law in the United States provides an avenue for
noncustodial parents to seek judicial relief in a federal district
court for the effective exercise of visitation rights.113 For this
reason, the district court’s ruling with respect to the visitation
issue was affirmed.114
III. ICARA DOES GIVE FEDERAL COURTS JURISDICTION TO
ENFORCE VISITATION RIGHTS
Plain Meaning of ICARA

The Second Circuit’s approach in Ozaltin, which granted
federal courts jurisdiction to consider such claims, is the better
approach, as it promotes greater protection for the child and thus
advances the purpose of the statute.115 A plain reading of ICARA
seems to confer jurisdiction upon federal courts to hear claims
regarding visitation. Section 11603 of ICARA, which articulates
judicial remedies, states that “[t]he courts of the States and the
110
111
112

114
115
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113

Id. at 373.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 374.
Id.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 374.
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42 U.S.C. § 11603(a)–(b) (2012) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (2012)).
Ozaltin, 708 F.3d at 372.
118
Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 200 (4th Cir. 2006).
119
42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4).
120
See id.
121
Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
122
Id. art. 29 (“This Convention shall not preclude any person, institution or
body who claims that there has been a breach of custody or [visitation] rights within
the meaning of Article 3 or 21 from applying directly to the judicial or
administrative authorities of a Contracting State . . . .”).
117
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United States district courts shall have concurrent original
jurisdiction of actions arising under the Convention” and that
“[a]ny person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings under the
Convention for . . . arrangements for organizing or securing the
effective exercise of rights of [visitation] to a child may do so by
commencing a civil action . . . in any court which has
jurisdiction.”116 The Second Circuit held that this language
“unambiguously” gave district courts original jurisdiction along
with the courts of the States.117
The Fourth Circuit nonetheless precluded federal court
jurisdiction on the ground that under the Convention, there are
no rights to initiate judicial proceedings for claims regarding
visitation.118 However, there is no requirement that ICARA be
read so restrictively. Section 11601(a) of ICARA, which sets forth
the findings of Congress, notes that the Hague Convention
“establishes legal rights and procedures for . . . securing the
exercise of visitation rights.”119 It is clear that Congress intended
that actions to secure visitation rights arising under the Hague
Convention be adjudicated in federal courts.120
Further, the Hague Convention itself has an objective to
“ensure that rights of custody and of [visitation] under the law of
one Contracting State are effectively respected in the other
Contracting States.”121
Therefore, the Hague Convention
recognizes visitation rights and seeks to protect such rights.
Finally, while the Fourth Circuit held that the Hague Convention
itself does not explicitly articulate rights to initiate judicial
proceedings for claims regarding visitation, the court failed to
recognize that the Hague Convention does advise that where a
Contracting State provides a judicial forum, a noncustodial
parent seeking to enforce visitation rights may initiate judicial
proceedings directly.122
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Legislative History of ICARA

Beyond the plain reading of ICARA, the relevant legislative
history makes it clear that federal courts were intended to have
subject-matter jurisdiction over enforcement of claims for
visitation. In March of 1986, the Department of State made
available the Letters of Transmittal and Submittal, English text
of the Convention, and legal analysis concerning the enactment
of ICARA.123 In the legal analysis section, the Department of
State stated:
In addition to or in lieu of invoking Article 21 to resolve
visitation-related problems, under Articles 18, 29 and 34 an
aggrieved parent whose [visitation] rights have been violated
may bypass the [Central Authority] and the Convention and
apply directly to the judicial authorities of a Contracting State
for relief under other applicable laws.124
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123
See Hague International Child Abduction Convention: Text and Legal
Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494 (Mar. 26, 1986).
124
Id. at 10,514.
125
Id.
126
While this legislative history, along with the text of ICARA, allows a
petitioner seeking enforcement of visitation rights to apply directly to state or
federal courts, for policy reasons discussed more fully infra, federal district courts
are the more appropriate avenue to obtain relief. See infra Part III.D.
127
Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting 134 CONG. REC.
6484 (1988) (statement of Sen. Alan J. Dixon)) (emphasis omitted).
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The Letter of Transmittal clarifies the function of articles 18,
19, and 34 of the Hague Convention, which is to allow a
petitioner to apply directly to the judicial authorities rather than
attempting to enforce visitation rights through the Central
Authorities of a Contracting State.125 Accordingly, this analysis
provides further support for the argument that a person seeking
to enforce visitation rights may apply directly to the federal
courts under ICARA.126
Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit also purports to rely on
legislative history in support of its contention that federal courts
may not hear visitation claims, citing statements made by
Senator Alan J. Dixon during the procedures to implement
ICARA, in which he states, “[T]he [C]onvention and this act
empower courts in the United States to determine only rights
under the convention and not the merits of any underlying child
custody claims.”127 In quoting this passage, the court seems to
suggest that preexisting visitation rights are not “rights under

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 315 Side A

04/08/2016 13:04:55

FINAL_CLARK

2015]

3/29/2016 3:12 PM

INT’L CHILD ABDUCTION REMEDIES ACT

1017

the convention” but “underlying child custody claims.”128 The
basis for this analysis, however, is not clear, as enforcing a
preexisting right does not involve determining whether that right
should be restricted in a particular case. The Hague Convention
merely directs Contracting States to maintain the status
quo—including the visitation status quo—until either the child is
returned to the originating state or the petition under the Hague
Convention is denied.129 That is, when the noncustodial parent is
seeking the enforcement of visitation rights under ICARA, the
visitation has already been granted by a court of the other
Contracting State. Therefore, the federal court need not consider
the merits of the underlying custody claim but only enforce the
rights that have already been granted, until the merits can be
decided by a court empowered to do so.
C.

Common Sense Approach

128

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

Id.
See Hague Convention, supra note 2.
130
42 U.S.C. § 11603 (2012) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 9003 (2012)).
131
Id. (“A petitioner in an action brought under subsection (b) of this section
shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence . . . in the case of an action for
arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of
[visitation], that the petitioner has such rights.”).
129

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 315 Side A

Contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s rationale, the Second
Circuit’s common sense approach to the interpretation of ICARA
indicates that it does vest jurisdiction in federal courts to hear
claims regarding visitation rights. The Central Authorities are
only able to offer “facilitative services” for a parent seeking the
enforcement of visitation rights.130 Further, § 11603(e)(1)(B) of
ICARA sets forth the burden of proof a petitioner must establish
in order to bring an action for enforcement of visitation rights.131
It seems unlikely, and is certainly not protective of the child, to
suggest that the drafters of ICARA would establish such
requirements if an aggrieved parent could do no more than seek
the “facilitative services” of the Central Authorities following a
breach of his or her visitation rights.
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132
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE
CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 42 (2007)
[hereinafter REPORT ON COMPLIANCE], available at http://travel.state.gov/content/
dam/childabduction/child_abduction_Compliance_Report.pdf.
133
Id.
134
See Steward, supra note 4, at 318.
135
REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 128, at 42.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
See Steward, supra note 4, at 329 & n.136 (“[D]epriving [a] child of [a] family
environment is equally detrimental regardless of [the] type of legal title [the] parent
possesses.”).
139
See Fraidstern, supra note 90, at 663–64 (quoting Pecorello v. Snodgrass, 142
A.D.2d 920, 921, 530 N.Y.S.2d 350, 351 (4th Dep’t 1988)).
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International child abduction has immensely detrimental
effects on not only the parent who has been left behind, but also,
and most importantly, on the abducted child.132 The abducted
child is taken from a familiar environment and abruptly isolated
from the family and friends the child once knew.133 The child’s
relationship with the left behind parent is almost completely
terminated, the child is forced to live in a new environment and
culture with which the child must quickly become accustomed,
and the child is kept in the exclusive control of the abducting
parent, who may use this opportunity to further alienate the
child from the left behind parent.134 Research has indicated that
a child who has been recovered from such abductions often may
experience a wide range of emotional and psychological problems,
including “anxiety, eating problems, nightmares, mood swings,
sleep disturbances, aggressive behavior, resentment, guilt, and
fearfulness.”135 Further, the relationship with the parent who
has been left behind may be gravely damaged.136 After being
reunited, the child is often distrustful of the parent and questions
why the parent did not try harder to find the child.137
Research shows that the removal of a child resulting in a
breach of a parent’s visitation rights is just as damaging to the
child as a removal resulting in the breach of custody rights.138 In
accordance with this fact and the rationale that visitation is not
only a right held by the noncustodial parent, but also held jointly
by the child, a high value is placed a noncustodial parent’s rights
to visitation.139 Therefore, when custodial parents breach that
right, they not only violate the rights of noncustodial parents, but
those of the child as well. Because ICARA is meant to protect
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IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR AN AMENDMENT TO THE HAGUE
CONVENTION
While a careful analysis of ICARA reveals that it does confer
jurisdiction upon federal courts to adjudicate claims regarding
the enforcement of visitation rights,141 an amendment to the
Hague Convention itself, clarifying the enforcement mechanism
available, would be beneficial to avoid further decisions similar to

141
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Cantor v. Cohen, 442 F.3d 196, 202 (4th Cir. 2006).
See supra Part III.
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children from the harmful effects of child abduction, it must
provide for more than “facilitative services” to remedy breaches
of visitation rights, which are just as harmful to children as
breaches of custody rights. It must also provide for enforcement
of visitation rights, as they are rights under the Hague
Convention and such rights are inextricably entwined with the
well-being of the abducted child. The most efficient method of
enforcing such rights, and the method authorized in the text of
ICARA itself, is through adjudication in the federal court system.
The Fourth Circuit asserted that state courts are better
suited to consider claims for the enforcement of visitation rights
under ICARA because state courts have the specialized training
and experience to deal with child custody matters.140 However,
as has already been established, the merits of the underlying
custody issue are not a proper subject for federal court resolution,
so it is unclear why that would be raised as an objection to
enforcing visitation.
When considering claims for the
enforcement of visitation rights under ICARA, the court is not to
examine any child custody issues. Rather, because a court in the
home country will have already examined those issues and made
an order for visitation, the court must do no more with regard to
child custody issues than enforce the preexisting order, therefore,
federal courts are better suited to deal with such claims. Courts
adjudicating claims for the enforcement of visitation rights under
ICARA are not required to consider any child custody issues but
rather must consider issues regarding diverse citizens and the
laws and treaties of the United States.
Thus, because
jurisdiction is expressly granted by the text of ICARA itself,
federal courts do have jurisdiction over such visitation
enforcement claims.
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those of the Fourth Circuit and the district courts. Further, such
an amendment to the Hague Convention would ensure more
consistent adjudication of visitation issues in all Contracting
States.142
An amendment to article 21 of the Hague Convention, which
instructs the Central Authority or judicial body to enforce
visitation rights by requiring the custodial parent to bring the
child to the noncustodial parent in accordance with the visitation
order, would alleviate some of the confusion presented by the
lack of parallelism between article 12 and article 21 of the Hague
Convention. Further, the Fourth Circuit’s holding that a lack of
defenses available for access claims precludes federal courts from
hearing such claims cannot be ignored.143 Accordingly, an
amendment allowing the defenses in article 13, which are
available to a person opposing the return of a child,144 to also be
available to a person opposing the enforcement of visitation
rights would give additional guidance to federal courts. This
guidance would bring article 21 of the Hague Convention further
in line with article 12 and could lessen the reluctance of federal
courts to assert jurisdiction over these claims for which ICARA
provides federal jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

142
See 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (2012) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 9001 (2012)) (“In
enacting this chapter the Congress recognizes . . . the need for uniform international
interpretation of the Convention.”).
143
See Cantor, 442 F.3d at 204.
144
See Hague Convention, supra note 2, art. 13.
145
Ozaltin v. Ozaltin, 708 F.3d 355, 359 n.5 (2d Cir. 2013).

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 316 Side B

The enactment of ICARA in the United States in 1988 was
meant to “fit [the Hague Convention] smoothly into our legal
system.”145 Regrettably, due to the overly narrow reading used
by many courts, ICARA has largely failed in its purpose in
connection with visitation rights. Fortunately for noncustodial
parents whose children have been abducted and taken to the
United States, the Second Circuit has interpreted ICARA in a
more child-centered and holistic manner, recognizing federal
jurisdiction for actions seeking the enforcement of visitation
rights. While the Second Circuit’s decision is a step in the right
direction for the interpretation of ICARA, an amendment to the
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Hague Convention clarifying the remedies and defenses available
when encountering a breach of access rights will help to prevent
decisions in the future similar to that of the Fourth Circuit.
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